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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Laor file

S 11521

Chippewa Indians in Indian Claims Commission dockets numbered 18-A, 113, and 191, and for other purposes; and

S.J. Res. 111. Joint resolution extending for two years the existing authority for the erection in the District of Columbia of a memorial to Mary McLeod Bethune.

The enrolled bills and joint resolution were subsequently signed by the President pro tempore.

HOUSE BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following bills and joint resolution were severally read twice by their titles and referred, as indicated:

H.R. 134. An act to amend title 5, United States Code, to repeal the reporting requirement contained in subsection (b) of section 1308; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 1409. An act to amend title 10, United States Code, to remove the restriction on the use of certain private institutions under the Dependents' Medical Care Program, and for other purposes;

H.R. 4606. An act to amend title 37, United States Code, to provide for the procurement and retention of judge advocates and law specialist officers for the armed forces;

H.R. 4729. An act to amend section 2107 of title 10, United States Code, to provide additional Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarships for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and for other purposes;

H.R. 6723. An act to provide subsistence allowances for members of the Marine Corps officer candidate programs;

H.R. 6724. An act to amend section 209 (a) and (b) of title 37, United States Code, to provide increased subsistence allowances for Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps members;

H.R. 8356. An act to make permanent the authority to pay special allowances to dependents of members of the uniformed services to offset expenses incident to their evacuation; and

H.R. 8656. An act to amend titles 37 and 38, United States Code, relating to promotion of members of the uniformed services who are in a missing status; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H.R. 9265. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize a treatment and rehabilitation program in the Veterans' Administration for servicemen, veterans, and ex-servicemen suffering from drug abuse or drug dependency; and

H.J. Res. 748. Joint resolution amending title 38 of the United States Code to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide certain assistance in the establishment of new State medical schools; the improvement of existing medical schools affiliated with the Veterans' Administration; and to develop cooperative arrangements between institutions of higher education, hospitals, and other public or nonprofit health service institutions, and the Veterans' Administration to develop and conduct educational and training programs for health care personnel; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

RECESS

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I think that this will be agreeable to the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair, not later than 2:25 p.m. today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(At 1 p.m., the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.)

The Senate reconvened at 1:28 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. BYRD of West Virginia).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without the time being charged to either side?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Without the time being charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

U.S. FINANCING OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, tomorrow, around 10:15 a.m., based, as I understand, on the statement of the distinguished majority whip, I intend to talk on the subject "Closing Loopholes: An Amendment To End U.S. Financing of Foreign Mercenaries in Laos."

RECESS

Mr. SYMINGTON. I now ask unanimous consent that the recess be continued in accordance with the previous understanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will stand in recess awaiting the call of the Chair, with the understanding that the recess will not extend beyond 2:25 p.m. today.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Chair for his courtesy.

At 1:29 p.m. the Senate resumed its recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 2:25 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. JORDAN of Idaho in the chair).

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9388) to authorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, what is the time limitation?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be 2½ minutes to a side.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the senior Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the amendment before the Senate now would prevent the detonation in the Cannikin test. I support the amendment.

I will place in the RECORD a sampling of editorial and newspaper comment from our State concerning the proposed test. I think the Alaskan point of view

is represented by these articles, and that is that until the necessity for the test can be demonstrated to us, we are opposed to it. We are in an earthquake area and we are in a tidal wave area, and there has been no demonstration that the test, even if successful, would be safe to our environment.

This should be first and foremost. We should be assured that even if the test is successful, which many Alaskans do not believe it will be, it will not leave a permanent scar in Alaska from a test that is not necessary at the present time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorials and articles to which I have referred may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials and articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Anchorage Daily Times, May 27, 1971.]

THE AMCHITKA TEST

We hope President Nixon will find it in the national interest to cancel the nuclear test that is scheduled for October at Amchitka. There could be no better resolution of a problem.

Cancellation would mean that Alaskans would not be exposed again to the horrible divisions and the frictions that are aroused during discussions of the dangers that accompany such an explosion.

Dispatches from Washington cite two reasons under discussion that might lead to cancellation.

One is the political risk involved in the blast. The risk is that a natural earthquake might occur at the time of the test or shortly after it, and the test would get the blame. It would be hard to prove that it wasn't.

The second reason for possible cancellation is the fact that the test may be unnecessary for national security because the Soviets have recently agreed to negotiate in regard to limiting anti-ballistic missile systems.

The purpose of the test is to develop a warhead for the Spartan missile, which is to be used in the defenses of the nation's Minutemen missile sites. The Spartan is a part of the anti-ballistic missile system.

If the Soviets will negotiate a limitations agreement, there will be no need for the Spartans and consequently no need of the Amchitka nuclear test for its warhead.

It is to be hoped that the facts will support the conclusion that the October test can be avoided.

This procedure is exactly as it should be. The President is basing his considerations on the latest developments in the field of diplomacy, and on the national security interests.

The noisy opposition to the test by the articulate opponents who frighten their friends with claims of radioactive leaks, earthquakes, destruction of wildlife, tsunamic waves and other horrible occurrences, is not the prevailing factor. It should not be.

Objective studies of the scientific investigations indicate that the test would be safe. The President should not allow the nation's security to be placed in jeopardy because of unfounded fears and unproven suspicions.

[From the Southeast Alaska Empire, May 28, 1971.]

REASONS ENOUGH TO CANCEL TEST

The startling fact revealed by the Army today that 949 tons of war gas was dumped into the Bering Sea nearly 24 years ago about 276 miles northwest of Amchitka, should serve to halt the proposed 5 megaton nuclear blast scheduled for this fall.

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The Atomic Energy Commission's proposed test, "Cannikin," has been the center of controversy in hearings held in Juneau this week and in Anchorage today.

Consensus of opinion from many Alaskans testifying in the hearings, is that the earthquake risk, as a result of the blast, would be highly undesirable. It would, according to the Griffin-Larrabee news bureau, create shock waves registering up to 7 on the Richter scale, enough to devastate a city.

Although this contention has been disputed by White House authorities speaking in favor of the test, no one seems to be really sure of the actual after effects.

Additionally, it has been brought out by people not participating in the hearings that the tests may hamper progress in the strategic arms limitations talks between Russia and the United States. According to these people, the political risk may be greater than the ecological risk.

We believe these uncertainties are reason enough to cancel the test.

[From the Anchorage Daily News,
May 28, 1971]
AEC HEARINGS

The Atomic Energy Commission's public hearings in the proposed five-megaton nuclear test on Amchitka Island move to Anchorage today. The AEC is bringing along its lineup of experts and they'll be presenting the agency's case for the test between 9 a.m. and noon at the state court building. After a break for lunch, the public will have a chance to express its views—pro or con—on the test.

The prospect of a device with the explosive power of five million tons of TNT being detonated beneath any part of Alaska—no matter how remote—should give everyone cause for thought. The test—believed to be of a warhead for the Spartan ABM—would be the most powerful ever detonated underground by this nation. It would be more than four times the size of the 1.2 megaton blast detonated on Amchitka in the fall of 1969.

The AEC maintains that the test will cause no earthquakes or tidal waves, will not release any radiation into the atmosphere, or sea and will not do any significant environmental damage. And that may well be so: the results from the first test on Amchitka were just about exactly what the AEC specialists had said they would be. There were no dire results.

Still, the proposed test would be much larger than the first one and the destructive potential of a five-megaton H-bomb is tremendous. There is a serious question whether the information the test would provide is worth the risk it entails—however small that risk may be.

Thus, we hope the hearings will be well attended, for every Alaskan has a stake in the AEC plan.

[From the Anchorage Daily Times,
May 26, 1971]

NIXON CONSIDERS HALTING AMCHITKA NUCLEAR TEST (By Mary C. Berry)

WASHINGTON.—The Nixon administration is considering cancelling Cannikin, the underground nuclear test scheduled for this October on Amchitka Island.

According to reliable sources, the administration feels the potential political risk, should an earthquake occur following the blast, may be too great in light of the recent agreement to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit defensive anti-ballistic missile systems.

The administration does not believe that the Cannikin explosion, which is expected to register 7.0 on the Richter scale, will cause an earthquake. According to the Atomic Energy Commission, the possibility that Cannikin will trigger an earthquake is "highly

unlikely" and the administration accepts this evaluation as accurate.

But the administration no longer feels it is as necessary to test the four to five megaton device, intended as a warhead for the Spartan interceptor missile, part of the United States ABM system.

Therefore, the political risk is being given greater weight in making the final decision on Cannikin than it was prior to President Nixon's announcement last Thursday that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to talk seriously about limiting their ABM systems.

However, the administration has not made the final decision on whether to go ahead with Cannikin. That decision will be made by the President himself.

The warhead to be tested in October on the Aleutian island is intended for the Spartan missile, the defensive part of the ABM system presently being installed at two sites in the western United States.

The purpose of the Spartan missile is to destroy incoming missiles, not by direct contact but by exploding close enough to them so that sufficient radiation is released to make their electronic systems ineffective.

The further out in space this explosion is intended to occur, the more powerful the warhead on the Spartan missile must be.

Under the U.S. plan for twelve ABM sites, the explosion must occur at a high altitude in order to protect all these sites hence the need for a powerful warhead. The federal government presently has authority from Congress to construct only two of these sites.

According to informed sources, what the U.S. would like to negotiate in the talks with the Russians is an agreement that this country would limit its ABM installations to the two presently under construction and the Soviets would limit theirs to the existing ring of ABM sites around Moscow.

The administration hopes the Russians will also agree to some limitation on SS9s, the huge Soviet offensive missile. This is because the SS9 carries a large enough payload to destroy a "hardened" missile site. The offensive portion of the U.S. ABM system, the Polaris, is intended for use on industrial installations and cities, rather than for Soviet missile installations.

Should such an agreement be negotiated in the forthcoming talks with the Russians, the U.S. would not need a four to five megaton warhead on its Spartan missiles since the missiles would have to protect an ABM system only one-sixth the size of that originally contemplated.

In the light of what the administration hopes to accomplish in the talks, the political risk involved in Cannikin if an earthquake were to occur anytime shortly after the explosion and the opposition aroused by it, even if no earthquake occurs, may be too great to be worth taking at this time.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a minute and a half remaining.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, the argument for delay is threefold. First, the information needed is not vitally necessary at this point in time in connection with our defense posture; second, environmental risks are such that the cost-benefit ratio or risk-benefit ratio falls heavily on the risk side; and, third, the obvious reason with respect to the climate only because it has been initiated and it should be fostered.

The argument that we have to do this because the Soviet Union is doing it can be laid to rest when it is realized that since 1963, when we placed a limitation on overt tests above ground, the United States has tested underground 228 times and the Soviet Union 51 times. So we

have overtested the Soviet Union by 4½ times.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I rise again to oppose the amendment. I urge one particular point that has not been touched on in previous debate. This amendment seeks delay until next spring. It may not be a sufficient argument to say that delay will cause \$18 million additional expense, but that is true. It is somewhat more cogent to point out that the time for this test was carefully selected in view of the importance of finding an ecological window; that is, a particular time in the ecology—the nesting habits of birds, the spawning habits of fish. Our concern for wildlife in this area has caused us to seek the ecological window when there would be the least trauma. That is what is referred to as the ecological window as it relates to the period chosen for this test.

I think this test is essential to the national defense.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, we have gone over this ground again and again. No argument has been made as to why this test should be delayed. We either should have the test or should not have the test. The point in question is: Is the test necessary? We have abundant evidence that it is.

Mr. President, you are either for the Safeguard or you are not for the Safeguard system. It is as plain as that.

We have been told by Mr. Packard of DOD and by the AEC that it is absolutely necessary. With respect to the President determining a national emergency, he has already evaluated and submitted his judgment on the need for this test when he sent in his request for funds to conduct it.

The only reason it is here is because the administration sent it in.

So I would say to my colleagues of the Senate that this is the time for reckoning. I was one of those who was opposed to phase 2, but if we are to have an ABM system, we have to have this test. That is the question we face. That is the question we decide here today. I hope the amendment will be defeated.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the amendment now before the Senate, jointly sponsored by the Senator from Alaska and the Senator from Hawaii, seeks to prevent a needless exercise in nuclear one-upmanship, an exercise that poses serious threats to man and his environment.

I believe there are the most compelling reasons for striking from the bill the \$19.7 million requested by the administration to carry out the Nation's largest underground nuclear test, the explosion of a bomb 250 times as powerful as the blast that destroyed Hiroshima.

First, it will be a small step away from the self-perpetuating spiral of nuclear arms development.

Second, it will end the threats posed by testing a 5-megaton nuclear bomb in